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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a default judgment of the Third 
Judicial District. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that defendants 
failed to show or represent that the contents of the requested 
documents might be incriminating? 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that defendants 
failed to provide sufficient information from which the trial 
court could make an intelligent evaluation of defendants1 claim 
of privilege against self-incrimination? 
3. Did defendants waive their claim of privilege by 
asserting in deposition that they had very few dissatisfied 
customers and by identifying their sales records as the basis for 
this assertion? 
4. Can defendants claim the privilege as to partnership 
records of which defendants are the custodians? 
5. Were plaintiffs required to allege their claims under 
Utah's former RICE statute with the same particularity as 
required for a grand jury to indict a criminal defendant? 
6. Are defendants entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are as 
follows: 
1. United States Constitution, Amendment V: "No person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself ...." 
2. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et seq (as enacted at time 
of plaintiff's complaint). See addendum at 1-4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiffs sued defendants' partnership and partners for 
fraud in the sale of investment real estate. The defendants 
refused to produce certain partnership documents based on their 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to 
the federal constitution. 
The trial court evaluated defendants' self-incrimination 
claims and found them to be groundless. The court ordered 
defendants to produce the documents, and defendants again refused 
to do so. The court held an evidentiary hearing, made findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered that defendants' 
answer be struck and default judgment entered. Defendants appeal 
this order. 
B. Relevant Facts 
Defendants Steve Holcomb and Bruce Honey were partners in 
and real estate agents/brokers for defendant Vantage Income 
Properties ("Vantage'*), a real estate broker partnership. In 
1985 defendants acted as the principal real estate brokers or 
agents of the owners of certain investment real estate located on 
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Vine Street in Murray, Utah. This real estate consisted of 
apartment complexes, a triplex, and a duplex. (Record 2-4 
(hereinafter "R."); Addendum 5-7 (hereinafter "Add.")-) 
Defendants approached plaintiffs Marion Webb and Jill Brown 
about purchasing the investment real estate. Plaintiffs lacked 
experience and sophistication in the purchase and sale of 
investment real estate, and defendants knew this. Defendants 
also knew that plaintiffs did not have the economic means to 
service the debt on the property. Defendants represented to 
plaintiffs that debt service would not be a problem because 
plaintiffs could resell the property at a profit a few weeks 
after purchasing it. Defendants represented that the property 
had a positive cash flow and that it had been appraised at over 
$1,000,000. (R. 3-8; Add. 6-11.) 
Defendants knew that the foregoing representations were 
false. In fact, the property had a negative cash flow, had not 
been appraised at over $1,000,000, and was actually worth only 
about $550,000. (R. 4-7, 9; Add. 7-10, 12.) Defendants also 
made other false representations that will be discussed in the 
Argument, Point V, infra. 
Relying upon defendants' false representations, plaintiffs 
purchased the property for $780,000 and hired defendants as their 
brokers to resell the property. Defendants failed to locate a 
ready, willing, and able purchaser who would pay over $1,000,000 
for the property. Defendants eventually told plaintiffs that the 
property was worth less than what plaintiffs paid, and 
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recommended to plaintiffs that they sell it at a loss. (R. 7, 8-
9, 11-12; Add. 10, 11-12, 14-15.) 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging claims for civil 
violation of Utah's former Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Enterprises Act1 (RICE), fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent 
misrepresentation. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. (R. 2-17; Add. 5-22.) 
At his deposition, Steve Holcomb asserted that Vantage had 
very few dissatisfied customers and identified Vantage's sales 
records as evidence of this. Holcomb stated: 
A Our company was very proud of the fact that in the 
hundreds of apartment houses that we sold, we had very few 
people that were dissatisfied with the service that we had 
performed. 
A Most real estate agents sell one or two buildings 
in their career and that's it. People that worked for me 
did business with their customers over and over and over. 
Our business was about 70 percent repeat business. 
Q You have referred to the fact that about 70 
percent of your business was repeat business. Did you have 
some sort of a customer list of the people who you were 
doing most of your business with? Again, I'm referring to 
VIP [Vantage Income Properties]. 
A I think I got that figure from a list of sales 
that we had made at one time during the year, and I could 
look back to see who the people were that bought the 
buildings and where we had met them and how many they bought 
from us, and it was about 70 percent. 
1U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et seq. This Act was 
subsequently revised and renamed the Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act (PUA). See § 76-10-1601 et seq. (as amended). References in 
this brief to RICE should, where the context requires, be 
interpreted to also refer to the PUA Act. 
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(Deposition of Steve Holcomb at 48, 54, 59; Add. 21-23.) 
Holcomb also disclosed that in at least two instances 
Vantage had purchased properties back from customers. He 
testified that there might be other instances, but he could not 
remember them. (Deposition of Steve Holcomb at 84-88; Add. 24-
28. ) 
To verify the truth of Holcomb's statement that very few of 
Vantage's customers were dissatisfied, and to check out why some 
customers had sold their properties back to Vantage, plaintiffs 
sought to obtain the sales records identified by Holcomb so that 
plaintiffs could contact those customers directly. In February 
1987 plaintiffs served requests for production on Honey, Holcomb, 
and Vantage requesting, inter alia, the record for all sales at 
Vantage and the names of all of Steve Holcombfs customers while 
he was at Vantage. (R. 63; Add. 29-30. ) At first, defendants 
simply failed to produce these documents. Such failure to 
respond was part of a continuing pattern of failure to respond to 
discovery requests. (See R. 32-33, 58-59, 103-104.) Later, 
defendants refused to produce the documents, claiming the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Plaintiffs brought a series of motions to either compel 
production or to strike defendants' answer for refusal to 
produce. The trial court granting these motions in a series of 
five orders. (R. 89-90; 139-141; 196-98; 217; 258-63; Add. 31-
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32, 40-46, 49-54. ) 2 For purposes of this appeal, the trial 
court's orders and the defendants' responses to these orders can 
be simplified down to the following: 
(A) Defendants failed to respond to the requests to 
produce, and the trial court ordered production. (R. 89-90; Add. 
31-32.) 
(B) Defendants refused to produce the documents based on 
their privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal constitution;3 
2
 These five orders were as follows: 
Order 
No. Date 
4/9/87 
10/26/87 
12/15/87 
2/1/88 
3/28/88 
Description of order 
Order compelling response to requests 
for production (R. 89-90; Add. 31-32.) 
Order that defendants explain their 
assertion of privilege against self-
incrimination (R. 139-141; Add. 40-42.) 
Order granting plaintiffs' motion for 
sanctions conditioned on defendants' 
failure to produce documents within 10 
days (R. 196-98; Add. 43-45.) 
Minute entry granting judgment for 
plaintiffs on RICE claim (R. 217; Add. 
46. ) 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Default Judgment on Plaintiffs' 
First Cause of Action (R. 258-63; Add. 
49-54. ) 
3
 Defendants claim on appeal the privilege against self-
incrimination under article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Defendants did not make such a claim before the 
trial court. (R. 120, 178; Add. 34.) 
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(C) The trial court ordered defendants to provide sufficient 
information from which the court could make an intelligent 
evaluation of their claim of privilege (R. 139-41; Add. 40-42); 
(D) In a written response to the requests to produce, 
defendants set forth the basis for their claim of privilege (Add. 
33-39- ); 
(E) The trial court ruled defendants1 written statement of 
their claim to be insufficient and ordered defendants to produce 
the documents (R. 196-98; Add. 43-45); 
(F) Defendants refused to produce the documents; and 
(G) The trial court struck defendants' pleadings and granted 
judgment for plaintiffs on their RICE claim. (R. 217, 258-63; 
Add. 46, 49-54.) 
The trial court's third order contains the following 
pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 197; Add. 
44. ): 
1. Defendants had not validly claimed the privilege 
because they "had failed to show and would not represent that 
there is anything contained within [the] documents that is 
incriminating." 
2. Plaintiffs had a right to verify Holcombfs deposition 
statements concerning repeat business by obtaining copies of the 
sales records identified in the deposition. 
3. By making the statements at his deposition concerning 
Vantage's satisfied customers, Holcomb had waived his right to 
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assert the privilege against self-incrimination as to the sales 
records and customer lists substantiating his statement. 
4. Defendants did not supply sufficient information from 
which the court could make an intelligent evaluation of their 
claim of privilege. 
Prior to making its final order, the trial court held an 
evidentiary hearing on damages and took testimony from plaintiff 
Marion Webb. In its fifth and final order the trial court made 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
support its third order (R. 259-61; Add. 50-52): 
1. Defendants knew or had reason to know that plaintiffs 
lacked business experience, knowledge and sophistication 
concerning purchasing and operating rental income property or 
real estate generally, especially buying and holding real estate 
for the short term. 
2. Plaintiffs bought the property because of the 
representations of defendants; without such representations, 
plaintiffs would not have purchased the property. 
3. Defendants defrauded plaintiffs. 
The court ordered that the answer of defendants Bruce Honey 
and Vantage be stricken as to plaintiffs' RICE claim.4 It is 
from this fifth order that Honey and Vantage appeal. 
4
 Judgment as to defendant Holcomb was reserved because of 
his pending bankruptcy. In August 1988 that bankruptcy was 
dismissed. In September 1988 the same judgment was entered 
against Holcomb. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
To properly invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, a defendant must generally show (1) that a 
response might be incriminatory, and (2) a possibility of 
criminal prosecution. The trial court found that defendants 
failed to show the first element, and this finding is supported 
by the record. Also, the record shows that defendants failed to 
show the second element. 
An additional requirement applicable to this case, since it 
deals with production of documents, is to show that such 
production would be a testimonial communication. Here production 
would not have been a testimonial communication, since the 
documents were already identified in prior testimony. 
A defendant waives his privilege against self-incrimination 
by putting forth his own version of the facts. Defendants waived 
their privilege in this case as to Vantage's sales records by 
Holcomb's deposition statements based on those records. 
An additional ground not considered by the trial but upon 
which the trial court's ruling can be sustained is that a 
custodian of partnership records may not claim the privilege as 
to partnership records in his possession. The disputed records 
in this case were the sales records of Vantage, and therefore 
this rule applies. 
Plaintiffs' RICE allegations are sufficient under 
traditional pleading standards. This Court should decline to 
adopt the standard articulated in Bache Halsey-Stuart Shields 
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Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. 
Utah 1983), which has been rejected by numerous courts. 
Under the American rule, defendants are not entitled to 
recover attorney fees on appeal. Defendants are not penalized by 
having to pay their own attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Standard of Review 
In reviewing a default judgment entered as a sanction for 
refusal to produce discovery, the appellate court takes the 
allegations of the complaint as true and conclusive as to the 
facts. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 
629 P.2d 231, 316 (1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). 
See also Brown v. Kenron Aluminum and Gas Corp., 477 F.2d 526 
(8th Cir. 1973); Olsen v. Kirkham, 720 P. 2d 217 (Idaho App. 
1986). 
POINT II: The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendants' 
Claim of Privilege under the Fifth Amendment 
The trial court did not err in denying defendants1 claim of 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 
The trial court's ruling is in accordance with federal law 
governing (A) the claim of privilege generally and (B) the claim 
of privilege in response to requests to produce documents. 
A. Claim of the Privilege Generally 
At the outset, it should be noted that defendants' claim of 
privilege before the trial court was based solely on the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal constitution, and not on article I, 
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section 12 of the Utah Constitution. (R. 120, 178; Add. 34.) 
The first time that defendants have claimed the privilege under 
the Utah Constitution is on appeal. Defendants are precluded 
from doing so under this Court's rule that appellants may not 
raise issues on appeal that were not argued before the trial 
court. 
This Court has previously had occasion to grapple with the 
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. In First Federal Savings 
& Loan Association v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984), this 
Court thoroughly analyzed the leading federal cases governing the 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The general rule 
culled from those cases was stated as follows: 
The privilege may be invoked if an answer might 
incriminate and there is some possibility that a 
criminal action might be filed. 
684 P.2d at 1262 (emphasis in original omitted), citing, inter 
alia, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75, 71 S. Ct. 
438, 442-43 (1951). In other words, the two requirements for 
claiming the privilege are (1) that the response sought might 
incriminate and (2) that there is a possibility of criminal 
prosecution. 
Regarding the first requirement, it need only be evident 
from the implications of the question asked that a responsive 
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure might 
result. 684 P.2d at 1263, quoting United States v. Hoffman, 341 
U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818-19 (1951). It is not 
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enough, however, to merely declare that an answer will 
incriminate: 
To sustain an assertion of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, a party must show that the 
responses sought to be compelled might be 
incriminating. This requires . • . "at minimum, a good 
faith effort to provide the trial judge with sufficient 
information from which he can make an intelligent 
evaluation of the claim." [684 P.2d at 1266-67 
(quoting Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th 
Cir. 1981)).] 
It is the trial judge, and not the claimant, who is the final 
arbiter of the claim. Id. 
Regarding the second requirement, the possibility of a 
criminal prosecution must be a "real danger," not a "mere 
imaginary possibility." Id., quoting Rogers v. United States, 
340 U.S. 367, 374-75, 71 S. Ct. 438, 442-43 (1951). Again, this 
would also require a good faith effort to provide the trial judge 
with sufficient information to determine that the possibility of 
criminal prosecution is real and not merely imaginary. 
In this case, defendants have failed to satisfy either of 
these requirements: 
1. Showing that response might incriminate. The trial 
court found that defendants had failed to show and would not even 
represent that the contents of the documents might incriminate 
them. (R. 197; Add. 44) A review of defendant's response to 
plaintiffs1 request for production shows this finding to be 
supported. At most, the defendants1 response gives a theoretical 
explanation of how the documents could be used to incriminate 
defendants; nowheye does it show or affirmatively represent that 
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the contents might be incriminating. (See add. 33-37.) 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that defendants 
had failed to supply sufficient information from which the court 
could make an intelligent evaluation of their claim. (R. 197; 
Add. 44.) 
2. Showing possibility of criminal prosecution. The 
defendants also failed to show or even represent that there 
existed any real danger of criminal prosecution. Nowhere in the 
record did they disclose the possibility of a pending criminal 
investigation or even that the police had talked to them. Their 
response shows that, at most, the possibility of such prosecution 
is an "imaginary possibility." Although defendants assert that 
Mr. Newton threatened to get Mr. Holcomb "off the streets, " and 
imply by this assertion a threat of criminal prosecution, the 
trial court's ruling rejects such an implication. The trial 
court's finding on this point should be sustained. 
In other words, the trial court's ruling is a determination 
that defendants' claim of privilege was not genuine but merely 
another attempt to frustrate the discovery process. Defendants 
could have shown their claim to be genuine in a number of ways, 
such as showing the documents to the trial court in camera, 
disclosing whether they were subject to a pending police 
investigation, or otherwise making some effort to explain how the 
contents of the documents might actually be incriminatory and how 
defendants were actually in danger of criminal prosecution. 
Defendants failed to make any such effort. Absent this, the 
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trial court was justified under the federal authorities reviewed 
in Schamanek in denying defendants' claim of privilege. 
A case factually similar to this case is Davis v. Fendler, 
650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the defendant was served 
with interrogatories and at first objected to them without making 
a claim of privilege. Later the defendant claimed the privilege 
because he was involved in a simultaneous, overlapping criminal 
action. The trial judge ordered the defendant to set forth his 
claims of privilege more specifically so the judge could assess 
their merits. Defendant responded with "answers" that simply 
restated the same objections that the trial judge had found 
insufficient. The district court struck defendant's answer and 
entered default judgment against the defendant for $37.9 million. 
The appellate court affirmed, stating: 
[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in 
entering default judgment against appellant. The 
sanction was imposed because of [defendant's] 
persistent unresponsiveness to both informal discovery 
requests and formal court orders. [650 F.2d at 1161.] 
In this case, as in Davis v. Fendler, defendants did not at 
first claim the privilege, but simply failed to respond to the 
requests to produce. Furthermore, defendants engaged in 
"persistent unresponsiveness" to discovery requests. Over and 
over defendants failed to respond to discovery requests until 
motions to compel were filed against them. (See R. 32-33, 58-59, 
89-90, 103-104.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting default against defendants. 
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On appeal defendants again do not affirmatively assert that 
the contents of the documents might incriminate them. Instead, 
they reiterate their abstract argument that since plaintiffs 
could use the contents of the documents to prove their civil 
claims under RICE, which has a criminal counterpart, the 
documents could, in theory, be used to incriminate them. 
If this argument were accepted, it would have far-reaching 
effects on discovery effort in civil claims under RICE or any 
other civil cause of action, such as fraud, that has a criminal 
counterpart. It is clear that every defendant of such a claim 
could assert the privilege on the same basis as the defendants in 
this case, i.e., they could assert that in theory their responses 
to discovery could be used to prove the elements of the criminal 
counterpart. If such a theoretical assertion of the privilege is 
sustainable, then all defendants of such civil claims could shut 
down discovery efforts against them even though a real threat of 
criminal prosecution does not actually exist. Plaintiffs ask the 
Court not to open up such a Pandora's box, which could end up 
undoing RICE and all other civil claims that have criminal 
counterparts. 
Moreover, contrary to defendants' argument plaintiffs have 
not sought the documents solely to prove RICE. Plaintiffs have 
sought the documents to verify the statements of Holcomb that 
over 70% of his customers were repeat business. That issue is 
relevant not only to plaintiffs' RICE claims but also to 
plaintiffs' fraud claims and prayer for punitive damages. 
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B. Claim of Privilege in the Context of Requests to 
Produce. 
When the privilege is claimed in response to requests to 
produce documents, an additional requirement exists. As this 
Court observed in Schamanek, "the Fifth Amendment does not inde-
pendently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of 
incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is 
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is 
incriminating." 684 P. 2d at 1264, quoting Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1579 (emphasis in 
original). 
In other words, since the Fifth Amendment only proscribes 
being compelled to be a witness against oneself, the production 
of documents falls within its scope only if such production has a 
testimonial aspect.5 The documents themselves, since they are 
already in existence, cannot be considered as testimony. 
Thus it has been held that to sustain the privilege in 
response to a request to produce documents, a court must both 
find the contents of the documents to be incriminating and find 
that the act of producing the documents is a testimonial 
communication. Whether the act of production is testimonial 
depends on the facts of the case. 684 P.2d at 1264; see Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1581 (1976). 
5
 The same requirement would apply under article I, section 
22 of the Utah Constitution, which this Court has interpreted to 
be no broader than its federal counterpart. Sandy City v. 
Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 138 (Utah 1987); see First Federal Savings 
v. Schamanek, supra. 
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In this case, the trial court's ruling supports the view 
that production of the documents would not be a testimonial 
communication. In his deposition, Holcomb had already testified 
as to the existence and identity of the documents sought through 
the requests to produce. Given this prior testimony, production 
of the documents would not also be a testimonial communication as 
to the existence or identity of the documents. 
Therefore, based on this additional requirement that 
production of a document be testimonial in nature, the trial 
court's ruling should also be sustained. 
POINT III: Defendants Waived their Right to Claim the Privilege 
Against Self-incrimination 
The trial judge also ruled that defendants waived their 
right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination by virtue 
of Holcomb's deposition statements asserting that Vantage had 
very few dissatisfied customers and identifying the sales records 
as the source of such information. This ruling was justified 
under the law and facts of the case. 
It has been held that the disclosure of a fact waives the 
privilege against self-incrimination as to the details of the 
fact. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373, 71 S. Ct. 438 
(1951); In Re Corrugated Container Anti Trust Litigation, 661 
F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981). A contrary rule would "open the 
way to distortion of the facts by permitting a witness to select 
any stopping place in the testimony." Rogers v. United States, 
supra, 340 U.S. at 371. Thus, a witness who voluntarily 
testifies on his own behalf waives the right to invoke the 
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privilege as to matters raised by his own testimony. In choosing 
to testify, a witness must weigh the advantage of raising the 
privilege against the advantage of putting forth his own version 
of the facts. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 
(1958); In Re Candor Diamond Corp., 42 B.R. 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
In this case, Holcomb chose to put forth his own version of 
the facts, i.e., that very few of Vantage's customers were 
dissatisfied. In addition, he revealed that certain customers 
had sold their properties back to Vantage. Therefore, it is only 
fair that plaintiffs be allowed verify Holcomb's version by 
obtaining copies of the sales records identified by Holcomb so 
that plaintiffs can contact those customers. As mentioned 
previously, these lists could provide information relevant not 
only to plaintiffs' RICE claim, but also to plaintiffs claim for 
fraud and prayer for punitive damages. If, contrary to Holcomb's 
statement, many of Vantage's customer were dissatisfied, and that 
is the reason Vantage repurchased their property, it is possible 
that Vantage engaged in the same fraudulent practices against 
these customers as against the plaintiffs. Such a pattern of 
fraud would justify an award of punitive damages and would 
substantiate plaintiffs' fraud claim as well as the RICE claim. 
POINT IV: Defendants Can Not Claim the Privilege for Partnership 
Documents 
This Court has often held that it will affirm a trial 
court's decision whenever it can do so on a proper ground, even 
though it was not a ground on which the trial court relied in its 
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ruling. E.g., Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction 
Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984); Rice, Melby Enterprises v. 
Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698 n.3 (1982). Such a ground 
may be considered even though it is raised for the first time on 
appeal. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 894-
95 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, such an additional, proper ground to sustain 
the trial court exists. The rule is well-accepted, known as the 
"collective entity" rule, that where production of corporate or 
partnership records is sought, an individual holding such records 
in a representative capacity cannot claim the privilege against 
self-incrimination to avoid producing the records, even though 
the records might incriminate him personally. Bellis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 85, 88, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (1974); Braswell v. 
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988); 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 
48 (1976). 
In Bellis v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that a partner in a three-man partnership could not 
rely on the privilege against self-incrimination as grounds for 
refusing to produce partnership records. The Court applied the 
collective entity rule even though the partnership had been 
dissolved. The rationale for the rule was that the privilege 
against self-incrimination applies only to natural persons and 
not artificial organizations. It followed that 
[s]ince no artificial organization may utilize the 
personal privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, . . . an individual acting in his 
official capacity on behalf of the organization may 
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likewise not take advantage of his personal privilege. 
[417 U.S. at 90, 94 S. Ct. at 2184.] 
The Court further justified the rule by looking to the 
policy underlying the privilege, which is the protection of 
personal privacy. Artificial organizations, such as 
partnerships, are entitled to no such privacy. 417 U.S. at 91-
92, 94 S. Ct. at 2184-85. Indeed, by statute they are often 
required to make their records available to inspection of their 
members or others. Accordingly, artificial organizations and 
their representatives should not be allowed to invoke the 
privilege. 
In Braswell v. United States, supra, the Court reaffirmed 
the rule in Bellis. In Braswell the person claiming the 
privilege was the sole shareholder of a family corporation who 
had been subpoenaed to turn over corporate records to a grand 
jury. The Court held that, regardless of whether a subpoena is 
addressed to the organization or to the individual in his 
capacity as a custodian, a custodian of organizational records 
may not resist a subpoena for those records by asserting the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
In the instant case, the rule articulated in Bellis and 
Braswell directly applies. Plaintiffs' request for production 
sought partnership records, i.e., the record of Vantage's sales. 
Honey and Holcomb possessed such records as representatives of 
the partnership. Therefore, under Bellis and Braswell Honey and 
Holcomb are precluded from asserting the privilege against self-
incrimination, even though they could be personally incriminated 
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by such production. On this additional ground, the trial court's 
ruling should also be upheld. 
POINT V: Plaintiffs Have adequately Pleaded Civil RICE 
Defendants argue on appeal that this Court should reverse 
because plaintiffs have not properly alleged a "pattern of 
racketeering activity" under Utah's former Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Enterprises Act (RICE), U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-1601 et 
seq. Section 1602(4) of that act provided: 
"Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging 
in at least two episodes of racketeering conduct which 
have the same or similar objectives, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are 
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing 
characteristics and are not isolated events . . . . 
The statute defines "racketeering activity" as an act 
committed for financial gain which is illegal under the laws of 
Utah "regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or 
indicted," and which involves one of a laundry list of illegal 
acts. Included in this list are (1) a scheme or artifice to 
defraud, (2) resale of realty with intent to defraud, and (3) 
false statements concerning land for sale. § 76-10-1602(p), (q), 
(s). 
Although the liability created by this statute was 
denominated as "racketeering," it would more accurately termed as 
liability for statutory fraud or other unlawful conduct. The 
successor to RICE has adopted this view by renaming the act as 
the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act." The trial court took 
this view of the statute, stating: 
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I prefer to call [this action] a . . . statutory fraud 
cause of action, because that's really what it is. . . 
. I prefer to use that term rather than racketeering. 
[Trial Judge's Ruling, February 9, 1988, at 4, 5; Add, 
47-48.] 
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint eight episodes of 
"racketeering," or as the trial court viewed it, statutory fraud, 
as follows: 
1. Defendants falsely represented that the roofs on the 
apartment buildings needed only "a couple buckets of tar" to 
repair them when in fact the cost to repair the roofs was over 
$40,000. (R. 6, 10-11; Add. 9, 13-14.) 
2. Defendants falsely represented that plaintiffs would 
not be required to pay real property taxes for five years when in 
fact real property taxes were due annually. (Id.) 
3. Defendants falsely represented that the cost to re-
meter each rental unit was $150.00 when in fact such cost 
exceeded $250.00. (Id.) 
4. Defendants falsely represented that the property had 
been appraised in excess of $1 million when in fact it had not. 
(Id.) 
5. Defendants falsely represented that the income from 
the property exceeded the expenses thereon. (Id.) 
6. Defendants falsely represented that if plaintiffs 
executed certain promissory notes, which notes plaintiffs did not 
have the present ability to pay, repayment would not be a problem 
because defendants guaranteed that the property would be sold 
within a couple of weeks. CR. 9-11; Add. 12-13.) 
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7. Defendants induced plaintiffs to execute other 
obligations that plaintiffs did not have the present ability to 
pay. (R. 8, 10-11; Add. 11, 13-14.) 
8. Defendants stated that the property was worth less 
than what plaintiffs had paid and that now plaintiffs should sell 
it at a loss. 
Defendants argue that in order for plaintiffs to properly 
allege RICE, the foregoing episodes must be alleged with 
sufficient particularity to satisfy a "probable cause" or "prima 
facie" standard necessary to obtain an indictment under Utah's 
grand jury statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-11-5. Defendants' 
argument relies entirely on a Utah federal district court case, 
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust 
Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah 1983). 
This Court should decline to adopt the pleading requirement 
articulated in Bache Halsey. Since Bache Halsey was decided in 
1983, numerous other courts have considered its approach and 
expressly refused to follow it. Haroco, Inc. v. American 
National Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff yd 
473 U.S. 606 (1985); Meyer v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 
698 F. Supp. 798, 806-807 (D.N.D. 1987); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 
F. Supp. 645, 670 n. 20 (E.D. Cal. 1986); Cincinnati Gas & 
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 77 (S.D. 
Ohio 1986); Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (N.D. Cal. 
1985); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Store Services, Inc., 608 F. 
Supp. 812, 815-16 (W.D. N.C. 1985); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & 
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Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 96 (D. Ore. 1985). 
The reasons for not following Bache Halsey are strong. If a 
plaintiff were required to establish probable cause or a prima 
facie case at the pleading stage, he would essentially have to 
plead evidence and prove his case before filing the complaint. 
This is not possible for civil plaintiffs, who, unlike grand 
juries, do not have any discovery mechanism available to them 
prior to filing the complaint. This concept was well explicated 
by the court in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust 
Co., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984), wherein it stated: 
With respect to Bache Halsey's discussion of grand 
juries, it should be recalled that a grand jury has 
significant investigative powers and resources, 
including a broad subpoena power. Before it decides 
whether to indict a person, it has extensive 
opportunities to discover and evaluate relevant facts. 
It should be obvious that a civil plaintiff has no 
similar discovery rights until it files the complaint. 
Yet the approach of the district court in Bache Halsey 
appears to require a plantiff to establish a case 
before any discovery is permitted. . . . While the 
court's motives [in Bache Halsey] are admirable, its 
approach seems to us to be impractical. We see no 
grounds for demanding that a civil RICO plaintiff 
essentially plead evidence and prove the case in the 
complaint. 
Under any other standard than Bache Halsey, the allegations 
of plaintiffs1 complaint would be considered sufficient. This 
Court should not impose the additional, unreachable standard 
created by Bache Halsey. 
POINT VI: Defendants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Finally, defendants request that they be awarded attorneys 
fees on appeal. Plaintiffs strongly oppose this request. 
Under the "American" rule, followed by this Court, attorneys 
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fees are awarded only when provided for by contract or by 
statute* E.g., Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985); Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 
(Utah 1981). Defendants do not cite such a contractual or 
statutory provision, nor do they cite any authority to vary the 
American rule in this case. 
Defendants rely on Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), 
for the general proposition that a person claiming the privilege 
should not be subjected to a penalty. From this general 
proposition defendants argue that if they are forced to bear 
their own attorneys fees on appeal, that would amount to a 
penalty, and that therefore plaintiffs should pay defendants* 
fees. 
Defendants1 reliance on Spevack is entirely misplaced. In 
that case, a lawyer who claimed the privilege was ordered to be 
disbarred. The United States Supreme Court held that the threat 
of disbarment constituted a "penalty" tantamount to compulsion, 
and thus was impermissible. There is nothing in Spevack remotely 
supporting defendants' argument that they are somehow subject to 
a penalty by having to bear the costs of their own appeal. 
"[N]ot every undesirable consequence which may follow from 
the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination can be 
characterized as a penalty." Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104 
(1st Cir. 1974). Certainly there can be no penalty where 
defendants are simply required to do what all litigants do, which 
is to pay for their own attorney fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling is sustainable on four grounds: 
(1) defendants failed to show they might be incriminated; (2) 
defendants failed to show the real possibility of criminal 
prosecution; (3) defendants waived their right to claim the 
privilege; and (4) defendants cannot claim the privilege as to 
partnership records in their possession. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
DATED this V ^ day of HltfrJg- ., 1989. 
James L. Ch^/stensen 
Paul D. Newron 
Mark J. Morrise 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiffs and respondents, 
hereby certifies that on June S r 1989, he caused the foregoing 
"Brief of Respondent" to be served on all parties to this appeal, 
by mailing copies thereof by first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Attorney for Defendants 
Michael S. Eldredge 
SNOW & HALLIDAY 
Attorney for Appellants 
261 East 300 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dated ' Mark J. Moftrise 
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ADDENDUM 
[This addendum is consecutively numbered, with page numbers 
at the top center of each page. The record numbers appear in the 
lower right-hand corner of the page.] 
76-10-1509 CRIMINAL CODE 000001 
of the owner of the property or the bus company, or its duly authorized representa-
tive is guilty of theft and shall be punished pursuant to section 76-6-412. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 8. 
76-10-1509. Obstructing operation of bus. Any person who unlawfully 
obstructs or impedes by force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the regular 
operation of a bus is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 9. 
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — Conspiracy. Two or more per-
sons who willfully or maliciously combine or conspire to violate section 76-10-1509 
shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 10. 
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of act. The provisions of 
this act shall be cumulative and supplemental to the provisions of any other law 
of the state. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 72, § 11. 
PART 16 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
Section. 
76-10-1601. Short title. 
76-10-1602. Definitions. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. 
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity — Authorized 
orders of district court. 
76-10-1606. Payments to general fund of state. 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. 
76-10-1608. Separability clause. 
76-10-1601. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act." 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1601, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to organized fraudulent 
and illegal enterprise crime; designating the 
following activities as unlawful: to use or 
invest proceeds from a pattern of 
racketeering conduct in an enterprise; to 
acquire or maintain an interest in, or to con-
duct an enterprise through a pattern of 
racketeering conduct; or to conspire to 
engage in such conduct; providing criminal 
penalties; providing for enforcement; provid-
ing civil and equitable remedies; providing 
for the rights of innocent persons; and pro-
viding that any aggrieved person may insti-
tute civil proceedings to seek damages; and 
providing an effective date. 
This act enacts part 16, chapter 10, Title 
76, Utah Code Annotated 1953. — Laws 1981, 
ch. 94. 
76-10-1602. Definitions. As used in this part: 
(1) "Racketeering" means any act committed for financial gain which is illegal 
under the laws of Utah regardless of whether such act is in fact charged or 
indicted, involving: 
(a) Criminal homicide; 
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(c) Aggravated kidnapping or kidnapping; 
(d) Forgery; 
(e) Aggravated burglary or burglary; 
(f) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims asserted 
through fraud, arson, unlawful public assistance, or Medicaid fraud; 
(g) Theft, including theft by deception, theft by extortion, theft of lost, mislaid 
or mistakenly delivered property, receiving stolen property, theft of services and 
theft by any person having custody of property pursuant to repair or rental agree-
ment; 
(h) Bribery; 
(i) Gambling; 
(j) Illegal kickbacks, including bribery to influence official or political actions 
.and receiving a bribe or bribery for endorsement of a person as a public servant; 
(k) Extortionate extension, collection and financing of credit; 
(1) Trafficking in controlled substances, explosives, weapons or stolen property; 
(m) Aggravated arson or arson; 
(n) Promoting prostitution; 
(o) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions; 
(p) False statements or publications concerning land for sale or lease or sale 
of subdivided lands or sale and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands; 
(q) Resale of realty with intent to defraud; 
(r) Sale of unregistered securities or real property securities or transactions 
involving such securities by unregistered dealers or salesmen; 
(s) A scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(t) Perjury; 
(u) Fraud in purchase or sale of securities; 
(v) The soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding 
another in commission of any of the above enumerated offenses; 
(w) Conspiracy to commit any of the above enumerated offenses; or 
(x) An attempt to commit any of the above enumerated offenses. 
(2) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or ben-
eficial interest in property. 
(3) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corpo-
ration, business trust, association or other legal entity, and any union or group 
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities. 
(4) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two episodes 
of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar objectives, results, partici-
pants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and are not isolated events, provided at least one of such 
episodes occurred after the effective date of this part and the last of which occurred 
within five years after the commission of a prior episode of racketeering conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1602, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts — Felony — Forfeitures. (1) It shall be unlawful 
for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person has partici-
pated, as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 
proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquis-
ition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activi-
ty to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
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(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of such enterprise's functions through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt or to conspire to violate any 
provision of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section, or to solicit, request, com-
mand, encourage, or intentionally aid another in the violation of any of the provi-
sions of subsections (1), (2), or (3) of this section, 
(5) Whoever violates any subsection of section 76-10-1603 shall be guilty of a 
second degree felony and in addition to the penalties prescribed by law shall forfeit 
to the state of Utah: 
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of section 76-10-1603; and 
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right 
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he has estab-
lished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in viola-
tion of section 76-10-1603 of this act 
(6) In any action brought by the state of Utah or, any county in the state under 
this part, the district court shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders 
or prohibitions, and to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the 
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or 
other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper. 
(7) Upon conviction of a person under this part, the court shall authorize the 
attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property or other interest 
declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and conditions as the court 
shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or trans-
ferable for value by the convicted person it shall expire, and shall not revert to 
the convicted person. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1603, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. Notwithstanding any 
law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah shall have authority to 
enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating investigations, assisting 
grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and assisting in the prose-
cution of criminal cases through the attorney general or county attorneys' offices. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1604, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by pattern of racketeering activity 
— Authorized orders of district court. (1) A person who sustains injury to his 
person, business, or property by a pattern of racketeering activity, in which he is 
not a participant, may file an action in the district court for the recovery of treble 
damages, the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any puni-
tive damages the court may deem reasonable. The state or any county may file an 
action on behalf of these persons injured or to prevent, restrain or remedy 
racketeering as defined by this part. 
(2) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering as defined by this part after making provision for the rights of all 
innocent persons affected by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropri-
ate, by issuing appropriate orders. The court shall determine issues by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and proceedings under this section shall be independent of 
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under the laws of this state. 
(3) Prior to a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or such other actions, includ-
ing the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any prop-
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(4) Following a determination of liability such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(a) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise. 
(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of 
any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of 
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which aflFect the laws of 
Utah, to the extent the constitutions of the United States and Utah permit. 
(c) Ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. 
(d) Ordering the payment of treble damages to those persons who are not found 
to be participants and are injured by the racketeering. 
(e) Ordering the payment of all costs and expenses of the prosecution and inves-
tigation of any offenses included in the definition of racketeering, incurred by the 
state, to be paid to the general fund of the state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1605, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1606. Payments: to general fund of state. The court may order payment 
to the general fund of the state as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered 
to be paid in other damages, of: 
(1) Any interest acquired or maintained by a person in violation of section 
76-10-1603. 
(2) Any interest in, security of, claims against or property or contractual rights 
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which a person has 
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in 
violation of section 76-10-1603. 
(3) An amount equal to the gain a person has acquired or maintained through 
an offense included in the definition of racketeering. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1606, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in civil proceeding. A 
final judgement or decree rendered in favor of the state or a county in any criminal 
proceeding brought by this state or a county shall preclude the defendant from 
denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1607, enacted by 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. 
76-10-1608. Separability clause. If any part of application of the Utah 
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprises Act is held invalid, the remain-
der of this part, or its application to other situations or persons, shall not be 
affected. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1608, enacted by Effective Date. 
L. 1981, ch. 94, § 1. Section 2 of Laws 1981, ch. 94 provided: 
"This act shall take effect July 1,1981." 
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0" vJ^V IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Y A STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No^—^bl/il-^ 
Plaintiffs complain of Defendants and allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
!• Upon information and belief, Defendant Vantage 
Income Properties ("Vantage") is believed to be a partnership 
composed of James W. Andrew, Bruce Honey and Steve Holcomb as 
partners, doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
conducting business as a principal real estate broker as defined 
by Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
2. Upon information and belief, Defendant Bruce Honey 
("Honey") is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and is 
the principal broker of Vantage Income Properties. 
3. Upon information and belief, Defendant Steve 
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Holcomb ("Holcomb") is a resident of Summit County, State of Utah 
and doing business as a real estate sales agent for Vantage in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
4. Plaintiffs Marian H. Webb and Jill w. Brown are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah* 
JURISDICTION 
5. Jurisdiction rests in the above entitled Court 
pursuant to §78-3-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
VENUE 
6. Venue is laid pursuant to §78-13-7, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) in that the causes of action set 
forth herein all arose in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
FACTS 
7. All representations, non-disclosures and acts of 
Defendants described herein were performed by Steve Holcomb as a 
principal partner and agent for Vantage, Honey and the other 
partners of Vantage and were performed within the scope of 
Holcomb's authority from Vantage, Honey and other partners; and 
were performed on behalf of Vantage and Honey and the other 
individual partners of Vantage as if all the relevant acts were 
performed directly by Honey, Vantage and its individual partners. 
8. At all times relevant herein Defendants were 
engaged in the business of selling real property for others and 
during the spring and summer of 1985 were acting as the principal 
real estate brokers or agents of Morris and Jo D'Leen Nesmith 
("Nesmith") the owners of certain real property consisting of two 
apartment complexes, a triplex and a duplex, located at 576-580, 
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588, 600, and 604 Vine Street, Murray, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah (the "Property") for the purpose of selling the Property to 
Plaintiffs. The Property is more particularly described on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
9. Upon information and belief, Nesmith represented to 
Defendants the value of the Property, the condition of the 
Property, and the profitability or lack thereof, of the Property 
including income and expenses. 
10. Defendants approached Plaintiffs about purchasing 
the Property and ultimately persuaded Plaintiffs to purchase the 
Property. 
11. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew or had 
reason to know that Plaintiffs lacked business experience, 
knowledge and sophistication concerning purchasing and operating 
rental and income property; and that because of this lack of 
experience, knowledge and sophistication, Defendants knew or had 
reason to know that Plaintiffs would not properly analyze the 
condition and value of Property in determining whether to 
purchase it; and that Plaintiffs further lacked the economic 
means to purchase the Property and thereafter properly operate 
and maintain the Property and the debts thereon and expenses 
arising therefrom. 
12. During the spring and summer of 1985 and prior to 
the purchase of the Property, Defendants or one or more of them 
represented to Plaintiffs that: 
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a. The condition of the roofs on the two apartment 
complexes on the Property needed "a couple of buckets of 
tar" to repair them when in fact the cost to adequately 
repair these roofs exceeded the sum of $40,000.00. 
b. Plaintiffs would not be required to pay real 
property taxes for five years when in fact real property 
taxes are due annually and if not paid included on the 
rolls for tax sale as delinquent real property taxes. 
c. The Property had been appraised in excess of 
one million dollars when in fact the Property had not 
been appraised by a certified and competent appraiser 
and its value was substantially less than one million 
dollars. 
d. The cost to re-meter each unit was $150.00 when 
in fact such cost was no less than $250.00 per unit. 
e. The income from the Property exceeded the 
expenses thereon when in fact the expenses substantially 
exceeded the income derived from the Property. 
f. The Property could be resold within a few weeks 
after the purchase for a sales price exceeding one 
million dollars when in fact no offer has ever been 
tendered to Plaintiffs to purchase the Property for a 
sum in excess of one million dollars and no written 
offer has ever been presented to purchase the Property 
from Plaintiffs exceeding $780,000.00, and the property 
is worth substantially less than one million dollars. 
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i. The expenses from the Property exceeded the 
income thereon. 
j. The Property could not be resold within two 
weeks after the purchase from Nesmith for one million 
dollars or more. 
14. Plaintiffs relied upon the representations and non-
disclosures of Defendants or one or more of them in purchasing 
the Property. 
15. On or about May 28, 1985, Plaintiffs in reliance 
upon the representations and non-disclosures of Defendants, 
agreed to purchase the Property for $780,000.00. The terms 
presented to Plaintiffs by Defendants included $80,000.00 as a 
down payment, ($1,000.00 of which had been tendered as a earnest 
money deposit which was held by Defendants), a $656,000.00 Note 
and all-inclusive trust deed in favor of Nesmith and a $44,000.00 
additional note in favor of Nesmith. 
16. Prior to July 2, 1985, Plaintiffs told Defendants 
that they could not purchase the Property because they did not 
have the $79,000.00 required to complete the downpayment. 
Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs could 
borrow approximately $34,000.00 for the downpayment for the 
Nesmith's benefit, then Defendants would look to Plaintiffs for 
payment of the commission after closing by taking a note for 
$46,800.00 secured by a Trust Deed. 
17. Upon information and belief, prior to July 2, 1985 
Defendants instructed Utah Title & Abstract Company ("Utah 
Title"), the closing agent and title insurance company, to 
prepare closing statements with terms directly contrary to those 
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amount if Plaintiffs would pay Defendants another real estate 
commission. 
21. Upon information and belief, the value of the 
Property is approximately $550/000.00. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Racketeering) 
22. Plaintiffs reallege all the preceding paragraphs as 
though specifically set forth at length hereat. 
23. Defendants are an enterprise, within the meaning of 
§76-10-1602(3), engaged in the business of buying and selling 
real property for others within the meaning of §61-2-1 et. seq. 
Utah Code Annotated. 
24. Defendants, as persons within the meaning of §76-
10-1602(2), Utah Code Ann., through a pattern of racketeering 
activity acquired directly or indirectly an interest in the 
Property in violation of §76-10-1603(2), Utah Code Ann. The 
racketeering activity includes acts committed for financial gain 
involving (a) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) false 
statements or publications concerning land for sale and the sale 
and mortgaging of unsubdivided lands and (c) resale of realty 
with intent to defraud. The numerous episodes of racketeering 
which constitute this pattern of racketeering are those acts 
representations and non-disclosures described in paragraphs 12, 
13, 16, 19 and 20. 
25. Vantage, Honey and Holcomb as persons within the 
meaning of §76-10-1602(2) and as persons employed by or 
associated with said enterprise, conducted and participated, 
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$30,000.00. 
c. Execution of a $16,000.00 Trust Deed in favor of 
Defendant Vantage Income Properties. 
28. By reason of Defendants1 violation of §76-10-1601 
et. seg. Utah Code Ann., Plaintiffs are entitled, pursuant to 
§76-10-1605(1), Utah Code Ann., to treble damages of $189,814.98, 
the costs of this suit, including a reasonable attorneys fees in 
an amount not less than $30,000.00, and punitive damages in a sum 
not less than $300,000.00 together with interest thereon at the 
legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraud and Deceit) 
29« Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21 
inclusive as though specifically set forth at length hereat. 
30. During the late spring and summer-of 1985, 
Defendants or one or more of them, did knowingly or recklessly 
make representations and non-disclosures to Plaintiffs of 
presently existing material facts more fully described in 
paragraphs 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20 herein. 
31. That these representations and non-disclosures were 
material to the Plaintiffs in connection with the subject 
transaction. 
32. Defendants or one or more of them made these 
representations and non-disclosures for the purpose of inducing 
Plaintiffs to act upon them. 
33. Plaintiffs reasonably believed these 
representations to be true and in ignorance of their falsity, did 
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39, Defendants also owed Plaintiffs duties of hon e s t y , 
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integrity, truthfulness, reputation, competency and fair dealing. 
40. Defendants breached these duties in that they were 
in a superior position to know the material facts described in 
paragraphs 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20 above and carelessly and 
negligently made false representations and non-disclosures 
concerning these facts to Plaintiffs for the purpose of inducing 
Plaintiffs to rely and act thereon. 
41. Plaintiffs reasonably believed these 
representations to be true and, in ignorance of their falsity, 
justifiably relied thereon in entering into a contract to 
purchase the Property, in purchasing the Property and in 
attempting to resell the Property and suffered injury and damage 
as a direct and proximate result of misrepresentations and non-
disclosures of Defendants. 
42. Plaintiffs are entitled to rescission of the trust 
deed note and trust deed in favor of Vantage, restitution of all 
payments in an amount not less than $33,271.66, consequential 
damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00, costs including a 
reasonable attorneys fee, punitive damages in an amount not less 
than $300,000.00 and whatever additional relief the Court deems 
proper. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Constructive Fraud) 
43. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21 
inclusive, as though specifically set forth at length hereat. 
44. The agency relationship of Defendants with Nesmith 
and Plaintiffs and the other circumstances surrounding the 
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$33,271.66/ for consequential damages in an amount not less than 
$30/000.00/ costs including a reasonable attorneys fee, punitive 
damages in an amount not less than $300/000.00 and whatever 
additional relief the Court deems proper. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
50. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 21 
inclusive, as though specifically set forth at length hereat. 
51. During the late spring and summer of 1985, 
Defendants or one or more of them represented to Plaintiffs the 
certain presently existing facts described in paragaphs 12, 13, 
16, 19 and 20. 
52. Plaintiffs reasonably believed these 
representations to be true and justifiably relied upon them in 
entering into the contract to purchase the Property purchasing 
the Property and attempting to resell the Property. 
53. The acts of Defendants were done wilfully, 
maliciously, outrageously, deliberately and purposely with the 
intention to inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiffs and/or 
were done in reckless disregard of the probability of causing 
Plaintiffs' emotional distress and these acts did in fact result 
in severe and extreme emotional distress to Plaintiffs. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of these acts and 
misrepresentations, Plaintiffs were caused to incur severe and 
grievous mental and emotional suffering, fright, anguish, shock, 
nervousness, and anxiety. Plaintiffs continue to be fearful, 
anxious and nervous. 
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55« As a resul t of Defendants actions Plaintiffs 
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consequential damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00, 
punitive damages in an amount not less than $300,000.00, costs 
including a reasonable attorneys fee, and whatever additional 
relief the Court deems proper. 
4. For their Fourth Cause of Action, for rescission of 
the trust deed note and trust deed in favor of Vantage, for a 
judgment of restitution against Vantage, Honey and Holcomb, 
jointly and severally, in an amount not less than $33,271.66, for 
consequential damages in an amount not less than $30,000.00, 
punitive damages in an amount not less than $300,000.00, costs 
including a reasonable attorneys fee, and whatever additional 
relief the Court deems proper. 
5. For their Fifth Cause of Action, for compensatory 
damages in the sum of $100,000.00 and punitive damages in the sum 
of $300,000.00. 
6. For such other and further relief the Court deems 
proper in these circumstances. 
DATED this day of %kSo\r^O^\ 1986. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
ames L. Christensel 
aul D. Newton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Address of Plaintiffs: 
2364 Evergreen Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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(Short i: ecess taken.) 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAK£ CITY, UTAH 84101 
1 Q Have you used them? 
2 A I have used those words, yeah. I would be lying if I 
3 said I have never used those words. 
4 Q What have you used those words in connection with? 
5 A All sorts of things. 
6 Q Give me some examples that you would use them in 
7 connection with. 
8 A I have got to jam my shoe on because it's too tight. 
9 Are you talking about in conjunction with real estate? 
10 Q Yes. 
11 A Mostly I used those words because I said, "I don't 
12 like to see that sort of thing happening here. You canft be 
13 jamming someone into an apartment house and expect them to be a 
14 long-time customer." One of the things about our company was 
15 that we did business over and over and over with people. They 
16 bought an apartment house, fixed it up, and sold it and they 
17 bought another one and fixed it up and sold it. You don't just 
sell somebody a building and run and hide like most real estate 
agents. Most real estate agents sell one or two buildings in 
their career and that's it. People that worked for me did 
business with their customers over and over and over. Our 
business was about 70 percent repeat business. 
Q Would it be fair to characterize another philosophy 
of VIP to not cram or jam buildings to people? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 J A T h a t ' s r i g h t . I t d o e s n ' t do you any good, 
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1 t h e r e . 
2 Q | My Mi ('In istPTisPi |i * \ "he lact 
3 that about 70 percent of your bu^ j.i,t oo <v^ > .cptu; business, 
4 Did you have some sort of < customer il^t ..»i - .• . eople N-O you 
5' wen e • i to 
6 VIP. 
7 A I think I qot that f Lqure from a list of sales that 
6 ] c: ::>] ;: back 
9 t o set--
 wr.. t i ;* ' p e o p l e w e r e t h a t b o u - . ^ t t ; ^ b u i i d JLIH-U. a i id w h e r e 
we hdhi • •* * hHTTf xnd h o w m a n y t h e y b o u g h t f r o m u s , a r i d : n w a s 
Q W e r e t h e y t h e s a m e p e o p l e ? 
A Y e a h . 
Q Wliei I y i -- . - • "i.a 1 PI>S 
were people who ;; >.* r,:-; ;• .* business wi-h betore? 
If,, | A Yeah. I carri^ or D«^r- 'v. tv^n tup start ar Income 
-v':i«:h * re when people c.ij ^ about m *p« J I t IH*-MI t uouse listed 
in *-h<* ^ pwsparn^ M I P fir^i couple m" vears, th^ first W»A 
, less- • 
* ^ •- 'usiness — 9 0 pciceni * :^binesb was wit.i people 
*"J1-1*- < *^ already dono business with They mst continued to 
24 seJao.T. i L^'.ru- A :
 f *. L «,* ' i., r* . * , 
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ownership? 
A No. 
Q What has happened to all the income properties you 
had owned? 
A I have either sold them, disposed of them, traded 
them, gotten rid of them. I have got plenty to do at 
Commercial Interiors. I don't have time for apartment houses. 
Q I want to go back for just a moment to the 
partnership with Honey and VIP. You stated that the reason 
that you dissolved the partnership was mutual. I would like to 
understand why you split up the partnership. What specific 
event caused the two of you to decide to split up the 
partnership? 
A There was no specific event. 
Q Any reason for splitting it up? 
A Yeah, I just got tired of working with him. 
Q Had VIP or you or Mr. Honey or the two of you ever 
purchased any properties back for people that you had worked 
for agents for in the sale of property? 
A Yes. 
Q How many times and how many properties? 
A Two that I can think of, 
Q Tell me about the first one, when it occurred, who 
the buyers were that you purchased it from. 
A The first one I think was a duplex on Edmunds Avenue 
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lu 1 A A f e l l o w named Danny B u r n e t t e . 
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12 C i r c l e ? 
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1? t h r o u g h o u r i.umpii ,» II o n . 
IB 0 When y o u s a y "our compar. o t e r n n u t.,, 
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20 w h i l e and t h o n tio so j i l i il
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1 now, but he asked us if we wanted to take it and we said yeah, 
2 we would. It was a small duplex, maybe worth—I don't know, 
3 50,000 bucks, 40,000 bucks. 
4 Q So why did you buy it from him? 
5 A The company needed—the company had made in profit, 
6 we needed a little depreciation. We had several agents there, 
7 a couple of them had expressed some interest in maybe wanting 
8 to go manage it for us. So I said, "We'll take it." He just 
9 signed a deed over to us. We didn't pay anything for it. 
10 Q This was Danny Burnette? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q You say there was another property you did something 
13 like that? 
14 A There were some people that bought a piece of 
15 property from us on—boy, I don't remember—if I can remeinber 
16 the street, about 13th South. 
17 Q You say they bought it from you? 
13 A From the company—not from the company, they bought 
19 it through us. 
20 Q You represented the seller? 
2i A And buyers. 
Q And the buyers? 
A We were—we did all that in our company and they were 
kind of skiddish and they didn't want to buy it, then they did 
and they didn't. The people do that all the time. They get 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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ouyer1 remorse, lu*
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A Glen Stevens. 
Q Any other situations like that the entire time you 
were with VIP where you had purchased back a property from a 
buyer for one reason or another? when I say purchased back, 
that's probably not the right way to put it. Whenever you 
purchased a property from a buyer for one reason or another— 
A Those are the only ones that I can remember. There 
may be some others, but as far as I can remember, that's all. 
Q On the second one, can you recall approximately the 
date? 
A 1982, I think. 
Q What I would like to do now is shift out of all of 
this general questioning and go straight to the Vine Street 
property that is the subject of the lawsuit. Are you aware of 
which property I'm referring to? 
A I think I am. What do you mean specifically? 
Q The Vine Street property that Marian Webb and Jill 
Brown, the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, purchased from Nesmith. 
Are you aware of the property? 
A I think so. 
Q 
from this 
A 
Q 
property? 
I will be referring to it as the Vine Street property 
point forward. 
All right. 
Mr. and Mrs. Nesmith were the sellers of the 
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639 
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. ) 
BROWN, ) REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 
) OF DOCUMENTS 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) Civil No. C86-1302 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, ) 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE ) Judge Timothy Hanson 
HOLCOMB, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, and 
pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby 
requests the Defendant Bruce Honey to produce the following-
described documents for inspection and copying at the offices of 
James L. Christensen, attorney for Plaintiffs, 215 South State 
Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah, or at such other 
reasonable location as Plaintiff or his attorney may designate 
within thirty (30) days from the date of this request. 
Request No. 1. A copy of the document dissolving Vantage 
Income Properties. 
Request No. 2. A copy of the Vantage Income Properties* 
Training Manual for appraisers and salesmen. 
Request No. 3. Names of all of Steve Holcomb's customers 
while he was at Vantage Income Properties. 
000030 
Request No, 4. The record for all sales at Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Request No. 5. A market analysis form of Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Request No. 6. A work-up sheet of Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Request No. 7. A sales training information sheet of 
Vantage Income Properties. 
Request No. 8. A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage 
Income Properties. 
Request No. 9. A copy of the listing agreement between 
Vantage Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith. 
Request No. 10. A copy of Bruce Honey's 1985 and 1986 tax 
returns. 
DATED this C"??— day of February, 1987. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
James L.Christens^n 
Paul D. Newton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2 
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639 
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382 
CORBTRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
\ ! 
PILED iN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt }<e County Utah 
APR 101987 
H. Dixon Kinciley, Cler&3rd Dist. Court 
th. *L„) &*-***ir****" ? 
1
 1 Deputy Clerk By 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
ORDER COMPELLING 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
Civil No. C86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hanson 
Plaintiffs' motion to compel came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled court on April 8, 1987 at 1:30 p.m.; plaintiffs 
were represented by Paul D. Newton, and defendants were presented 
by Terry C. Turner and Michael S. Eldredge; and the court having 
heard arguments of counsel including defendants' oral motion for 
a protective order prohibiting any discovery and having reviewed 
the file, pleadings, and other documents represented to the court 
for the purpose of these motions and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Defendants' oral motion for a protective order is 
hereby denied; 
UUUU3Z 
2. Plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants Steve Holcomb 
and Vantage Income Properties to respond to their request for 
production of documents is granted; 
3* By April 9, 1987, Defendants mu^t respond to plaintiffs 
request for production of documents da£ed February 23, 1987, 
DATED this V day of April/1987 
lorable Timothy Hanson 
/District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ATTEST 
H.DJX0NH1NDLEY 
T^fry C/ Turner 7 
Attorney for defendants 
Steve Holcomb and Vantage 
Income Properties 
Ceo jtv Cic 
4 
000033 
Michael S. Eldredge (USB#0967) 
Terry C. Turner (USB#3299) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone 263-1511 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES 
TO PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. C-86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
* * * * * * * 
COME NOW Defendants Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties, and 
pursuant to the Order of the Court entered herein on October 5, 
1987, supplement their responses to Plaintiffs1 Request for Production 
of Documents as previously delivered to Plaintiffs on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 1. A copy of the document dissolving Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No, 2. A copy of the Vantage Income Properties' Training 
Manual for appraisers and salesmen. 
Response: Said document was erroneously indicated as having 
been produced on April 8, 1987, however, Defendants have been 
unable to locate such documents. Defendants have no objection to 
producing such documents and will continue their efforts to locate 
such documents and produce them if and when they are available. 
UUUU34 
Request No. 3, Names of all of Steve Holcomb^ customers while he 
was at Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Such information does not exist on a single document, 
however can be derived from the sales records of Vantage Income 
Properties. Defendants object to producing such information and/or 
documents, and invoke their 5th amendment privilege against self-
incrimination for the following reasons. Plaintiffs have stated 
repeatedly, in their oral arguments before this Court on April 8, 
1987, in their Memorandum in Support of Striking Defendants' Answer 
on file herein, and in their oral argument before this Court on 
October 5, 1987, that the expressed purpose of obtaining information 
under this request is to discover information that will support 
their claims under the First Cause of Action in the Complaint 
herein against Defendants for alleged violations of the Utah Racket-
eering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act ("RICE") specifically 
enumerated in §§ 76-10-1602(p),(q) and (s). 
The specific provisions allegedly violated by Defendants, as 
set forth in the First Cause of Action in the Complaint herein, 
constitute a second degree felony in the State of Utah. §§ 76-
10-1602 and 76-10-1603 state that a "pattern of racketeering 
activity" must be proved to establish liability. Plaintiffs 
further assert in their First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action 
that Defendants have committed acts or omissions that would 
constitute criminal violations of the Communications Fraud statute 
found at § 76-10-1801 of the Criminal Code which would also 
constitute a second degree felony. 
-2-
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Plaintiffs seek to support their allegations of racketeering 
in the Complaint herein by "fishing" through the sales records and 
customers of Steve Holcomb in an attempt to find anyone who might 
join in Plaintiffs' criminal allegations and thus establish a 
"pattern of racketeering activity." This was expressly represented 
by Paul Newton, counsel for Plaintiffs at the hearing on October 
5, 1987, who stated substantially, or words to the effect, that 
Plaintiffs wanted to find other customers who were no longer 
"loyal" to Mr. Holcomb, and assist Plaintiffs in their efforts to 
"get him off the streets." 
If Defendants are required to produce such documents, and, if 
Plaintiffs are successful in establishing sufficient evidence from 
such records that Defendants have indeed violated provisions of 
RICE and thus committed a second degree felony, then such violations 
shall have been established through their own testimony, in direct 
conflict with their expressed desire and constitutional privilege 
not to provide any testimony that would tend to incriminate 
themselves. It is well established that Plaintiffs have a 
burden of establishing such criminal liability on the face of 
their complaint in order to obtain the treble damages they seek 
as civil relief under §76-10-1605. If Plaintiffs have carried 
their burden, there is no need for further supportive discovery. 
If they have not pleaded violations of RICE sufficient to establish 
liability under RICE, which in this case is clear they have not, 
then they cannot force Defendants, in violation of their 5th 
amendment rights, to provide information that could be used in 
-3-
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any way to establish such liability and prove that Defendants had 
indeed committed a second degree felony. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Holcomb has previously waived 
his 5th amendment rights in testimony found on pages 48, 54, 59, 
60, and 84-88 of Mr. Holcomb1s deposition of December 4, 1986, 
which deposition remains unpublished in this action. Defendants 
assert that Defendant Holcomb has made no representation whatsoever 
on those pages, or at any other part of said deposition that he has 
committed any act that can be construed as a criminal violation of 
RICE or any other criminal statute that would constitute a waiver 
of his 5th amendment rights, nor has he testified to any matter 
therein that can only be verified or established by a review of the 
sales records of Vantage Income Properties or customer lists of 
Steve Holcomb. 
Mr. Newton argued before the Court on October 5, 1987 that Mr. 
Holcomb had testified that there were numerous times that he had 
to take property back, implying to the Court that Mr. Holcomb had 
committed alleged criminal acts. As clearly stated on the pages 
referred to by Plaintiffs1 counsel in the deposition, each decision 
by Mr. Holcomb to take property back was based on a business judgment 
that served the interests of all parties concerned, and in no 
instance were the Defendants ever compelled to take back such 
properties. 
In summary, Defendants object to providing information in the 
sales records or from Mr. Holcomb's list of customers on the basis 
that any information found by Plaintiffs in such records and lists 
-4-
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that could support their expressed goal of proving their allegations 
of criminal violations by Defendants, and establish a pattern of 
racketeering, or any other provision of the RICE or Communications 
Fraud statutes, would accordingly be incriminating, and consequently 
Defendants invoke their 5th amendment right not to testify in any 
manner against themselves. This objection is supported by Defendants 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion to Strike Defendants1 
Answer which was previously filed in this matter and argued before 
the Court on October 5, 1987, which memorandum is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
Request No. 4. The record for all sales at Vantage Income Properties, 
Response: Defendants incorporate their response to Request 
No. 3 as if fully set forth herein. 
Request No. 5. A market analysis form of Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 6. A work-up sheet of Vantage Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 7. A sales training information sheet of Vantage 
Income Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 8. A neighborhood survey prepared by Vantage Income 
Properties. 
Response: Said document was produced on April 8, 1987. 
Request No. 9. A copy of the listing agreement between Vantage 
Income Properties and Morris and Jo D'leen Nesmith. 
Response: Upon review of the records and documents of the 
-5-
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transactions between Nesmiths and Plaintiffs, Defendants have 
been unable to locate a listing agreement between Nesmiths and 
Vantage Income Properties. Defendants believe that no such 
agreement was ever entered into, and that Nesmiths negotiated 
with Plaintiffs solely on the basis of the earnest money offer 
presented by Plaintiffs, after Vantage Income Properties had 
determined from Nesmiths that they were interested selling their 
property if a suitable offer were made. This practice is not 
uncommon in the industry. 
Request No. 10. A copy of the 1986 tax return for Steve Holcorab. 
Response: Said document is expected to be available on or 
about October 15, 1987 when Mr. Holcomb's extension for filing 
will expire^ It will be forwarded to Plaintiffs immediately as 
it becomes available. yr\ 
DATED this, Z6/^ day of C v 6 ^ % ^ t , 987. 
// UtfLos^* 
MICKAELSTEL&REBGE 
Co-counsel for Defendants 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs' Request 
For Production of Documents to James L. Christensen, Esq* and 
Paul D. Newton, Esq., counsel for Plaintiffs, at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD 
& CHRISTENSEN, 215 South State Street^ Suite 800, Salt Lake City, 
r A£/ l , 1 9 8 7 . 
 ISTE SE , 215 South S t a t e S t r e e t , Sui t 
Utah 84111, t h i s /H ^ day of C JdS/>Jl 
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James L. Christensen (Bar No. A0639) 
Paul D. Newton (Bar No, 4382) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
0 C T 2 61987 
H Dtfon Hindley, OrnkptS?***** 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendantse 
ORDER 
Civil No. C86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hanson 
On October 5, 1987, plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants1 
Answer and enter default judgment came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled court. Plaintiffs were represented by Paul D. 
Newton and defendants were represented by Michael S. Eldredge, 
The court, having reviewed the pleadings and other documents on 
file, having heard arguments of counsel and good cause appearing 
therefor, does hereby order, adjudge and decree as follows: 
1. Defendant Bruce Honey is hereby ordered to respond to 
plaintiffs1 Third Set of Request for Production of Documents. 
2. Also under the Third Set of Request for Production of 
Documents, defendants Steve Holcomb and Vantage Income Properties 
are hereby ordered to modify the response to request no. 2 to 
000041 
show that the document requested cannot be located and was not 
delivered to plaintiffs. 
3. Because defendants Steve Holcomb and Vantage Income 
Properties failed to meet their burdens to provide the court with 
sufficient information from which the court could make an 
intelligent evaluation of the claim of privilege against self-
incrimination, defendants Steve Holcomb and Vantage Income 
Properties are hereby ordered to provide the court with 
sufficient information from which the court can make an 
intelligent evaluation of their claim of privilege against self-
incrimination as asserted in these defendants1 initial response 
to request nos. 3 and 4 under Plaintiffs' Third Set of Request 
for Production of Documents. 
4. The deadline for the responses required under 
paragraphs 1, 2 , and 3 above is October 15, 1987. 
5. The court hereby preserves its ruling on plaintiffs' 
Motion under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
strike defendants1 Answer and enter default judgment pending the 
defendants' compliance with all orders herein within the required 
time limit of October 15, 1987, and then the court will grant or 
deny plaintiffs' motion. 
6. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is 
hereby granted subject to the court's later determination of the 
sum to award. 
* 1L\ 
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DATED t h i s <?£ day of 
Approved As To Form: 
/i ~7i> 
*'. ,'J 
) 
j 
, 1987, 
fge Timothy Hanson 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HtWDvEV 
Decatv Cif* 
Michael S* Eldredge 
Co-Counsel for Defendants 
<j2>t 5^.^ y C w / ^ ^ ' ^ ^ 
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James L. Christensen (Bar No. A0639) 
Paul D. Newton (Bar No. 4382) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
215 South State, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN H. WEBB and JILL W. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES, 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND TO 
PUBLISH DEPOSITION OF 
DEFENDANT STEVE HOLCOMB 
Civil No. C86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hansen 
On December 7, 1987, at 2:00 p.m., plaintiffs' Motion for 
Sanctions and to Publish Deposition of Defendant Steve Holcomb 
came on for hearing before the above-entitled court. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Paul D. Newton and defendants were 
represented by Michael S. Eldredge and Terry C. Turner. The 
court, having reviewed the pleadings and other documents on file, 
having heard arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In his deposition taken on December 4, 1986, defendant 
Steve Holcomb testified that "Our company was very proud of the 
fact that in the hundreds of apartment houses that we sold, we 
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had very few people that were dissatisfied with the service that 
we had performed." Plaintiffs have a right to verify the truth 
of the preceding statement and others like it. By making such a 
statement, defendants waived their right to raise the Fifth 
Amendment under the U.S. Constitution as an objection and 
privilege to Request Nos. 3 and 4 under plaintiffs1 Request for 
Production of Documents dated February 23, 1987. 
2. Defendants cannot assert the Fifth Amendment as an 
objection and privilege to plaintiffs' request for production of 
documents when defendants have failed to show and would not 
represent that there is anything contained within such documents 
that is incriminating. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Publish Deposition of Steve 
Holcomb is granted. 
2. Defendants have not met their burden in asserting the 
Fifth Amendment and have not complied with paragraph 3 of the 
court's Order dated October 26, 1987, requiring sufficient 
information from which the court can make an intelligent 
evaluation of defendants' claim of privilege against self 
incrimination. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is granted subject to 
the following conditions: 
a. Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, 
defendants shall produce to plaintiffs copies of the 
documents requested by plaintiffs under their Request for 
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Production of Documents dated February 23, 1987, request 
nos. 3 and 4; 
b. In the event defendants fail to produce to 
plaintiffs the documents requested by request nos. 3 and 4, 
then plaintiffs, by ex parte motion supported by affidavit, 
may move the court for an order striking defendants' 
pleadings and Answers and granting plaintiffs judgment 
against defendants as prayed for in plaintiffs' Complaint. 
4. Because defendants have asserted the Fifth Amendment 
without any foundation, plaintiffs are entitled to their costs, 
including attorney's fees, for the hearings on October 5, 1987, 
and December 7, 1987, which sums the court shall determine at a 
/ 
later date. 
DATED this /± day of December, 1957. 
Approved As To Form: 
Michael S. Eldredge 
Terry C. Turner / 
Co-Counsel for Defendants 
ibnofable Timothy Hanson 
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these cover concepts of proximate cause. But just to be 
extraordinarily cautious in this matter, I think it's 
appropriate to allow that inquiry, and I will consider 
it. And I'm not going to assume for the sake of this 
ruling that the defendants are foreclosed from examining 
the question of proximate cause, because I intend to 
examine it in this ruling. 
The knowledge we need to keep in mind here is that 
on the first cause of action, there was no question 
about, it starts on page eight of the complaint, and 
paragraph twenty-two, which is the first paragraph in the 
first cause of action, which alleges the Rice claim under 
Section 76-10-1601, I believe, and following sections of 
the Utah Code, it incorporates all proceeding paragraphs. 
And those preceding paragraphs are the basis for, at 
least in part, the claim under the racketeering cause of 
action. And I don't like that word, because that implies 
something that's not there. It implies some criminal 
conduct that is not envisioned by a civil statute. 
In any event, it's this action. I prefer to call it 
a fraud cause of action, statutory fraud cause of action, 
because that's really what it is. I think the code that 
deals with this statute specifically indicates. For 
example, in Section 76-10-1604, talking about — excuse 
me, 1605, talking about remedies, and damages, and et 
Bunnv C. Neuenschwander, CSR. RPR A 
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cetera, the legislature in sub part three indicate that 
the action is grounded in fraud action and go on to state 
that it's subject to arbitration under Chapter 31, Title 
78. 
That suggests to me that what the legislature had in 
mind that this is a traditional fraud claim, but it has 
been reduced to common law fraud, reduced to statute and 
adopted by the legislature in a particular set of 
circumstances. And while common law fraud can encompass 
any activity, this is limited to the Rice statute — is 
limited to the activities described in the statute 
itself, but it is a fraud statute. And I prefer to use 
that term rather than racketeering. 
That envisions all kinds of mob things with all the 
traditional concepts that run with that type of language, 
and that just doesn't have to be present in an action 
brought under this statute. In any event, paragraphs 
seven through twenty-one are encompassed in the first 
cause of action. First cause of action is one in which 
the default has been entered, and you all understand why 
the default is there, and we don't need to discuss that 
further, but in any event, the default is there, and 
that's where we are. 
The principle note, one of the allegations in 
paragraph eleven — I don't mean to exclude the others, 
Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR 5 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION H. WEBB and JILL W, 
BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VANTAGE INCOME PROPERTIES 
BRUCE HONEY, and STEVE 
HOLCOMB, 
Defendants. 
^ h , Q \ e > K \ Q . ^ S S 
3-a<VS%-%4bc-v^ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ON PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil No. C86-1302 
Judge Timothy Hanson 
Pursuant to (a) Plaintiffs* Motion to Strike Defendants' 
Answer and Enter Default Judgment dated September 18, 1987; (b) 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Sanctions dated October 29, 1987; (c) 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions dated December 
15, 1987; (d) Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for an Order Striking 
Defendants' Pleadings and answers and Granting Plaintiffs Default 
Judgment against Defendants; (e) Affidavit of James L. 
Christensen in Support of Ex parte Motion; (f) the Court's Order 
arising out of a hearing on January 4, 1988; (g) Defendants 
Notice of Intent Not to Produce Documents dated January 21, 1988; 
(h) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Answers and Grant 
Plaintiffs' Judgment; and (i) An evidentiary hearing on February 
9, 1988 during which the Court took evidence on the issues of 
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causation and damages, the court having previously ruled on 
February 1, 1988 that Plaintiffs1 were entitled to default 
judgment on their first cause of action and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises and having reviewed the pleadings and 
other documents on file and having heard arguments of counsel and 
having taken evidence on the issues of causation and damages and 
good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based upon defendants' default and the evidence received by 
the Court, the Court hereby makes the following findings of fact 
as to defendants Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey 
(hereinafter "Defendants"): 
lc The factual allegations contained in paras. 7 through 
21 of Plaintiffs' complaint are deemed true. 
2. Defendants knew or had reason to know that plaintiffs 
lacked business experience, knowledge and sophistication 
concerning purchasing and operating rental income property or 
real estate generally, especially buying and holding real estate 
for the short term, 
3. Plaintiffs' intended to hold the Clearbrook property 
for a short period of time; the principal purpose in purchasing 
this property was to turn it around, and not to keep it. 
4. Epco is an assumed name and has no impact on the 
hearing on damages. 
5. Plaintiffs bought the Clearbrook property because of 
2 
000051 
the representations of defendants; plaintiffs would not have 
bought the property otherwise. 
6. Defendants knew of the plaintiff's line of credit from 
which plaintiff Marion H. Webb borrowed most of the down payment 
used for purchasing the Clearbrook property. 
7. Plaintiffs paid $35,000.00 as a down payment for the 
purchase of the Clearbrook property. 
8. Plaintiffs incurred interest expense because of the 
credit line loan. 
9. Plaintiff Marion Webbfs need to obtain a mortgage to 
pay off the credit line was a reasonably foreseeable act 
resulting from defendants fraudulent conduct 
10. Plaintiffs have incurred interest expense of $10,791.92 
in payments on the credit line and the new mortgage. 
11. Plaintiffs have incurred closing costs of $2,005.63 
which were proximately related and reasonably foreseeable because 
of the fraudulent acts of defendants. 
12. Plaintiffs have incurred attorneys fees in the amount 
of $6,521.00. 
13. Neither defendant Vantage Income Properties nor its 
successors has made demand upon plaintiff for payment of the 
trust deed note in the amount of $16,000.00 dated July 2, 1985. 
14. The trust deed securing the above trust deed note was 
subject to a senior mortgage. 
15. The senior mortgage has been foreclosed. 
16. The Court makes no findings as to defendant Steve 
3 
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Holcomb who filed a petition for relief in bankruptcy, File No, 
88A-00959 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
Court of Utah, Central Division. 
17c The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment contained herein 
are the same as those previously served upon defendants' counsel 
by mailing on February 16, 1988 except that no finding nor 
conclusion is made nor judgment entered against Steve Holcomb. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court hereby 
makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. Pursuant to prior orders of the court, plaintiffs are 
entitled to an order striking defendants' answers and pleadings 
regarding plaintiffs' first cause of action and plaintiffs are 
entitled to a default judgment on their first cause of action. 
2. Defendants have defrauded plaintiffs. 
3. Damages discussed in the findings were all reasonably 
foreseeable and proximately caused by defendants in light of 
their fraudulent conduct. 
4. Damages are to be trebled pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-1605 (as enacted in 1981) which section governs 
this case. 
5. The court's order disposes of significant issues of 
this case. 
6. Plaintiffs have not been damaged by Defendants failure 
to demand payment of the $16,000.00 trust deed note. 
7. The principal reason for plaintiffs' loss was the fraud 
4 
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of defendants• 
8. The $16,000.00 trust deed note is unsecured. 
9. The court reserves the right to include Steve Holcomb 
in these findings and conclusions and judgment herein at such 
time as the automatic stay in his bankruptcy does not apply. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, the court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
le Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court expressly determines and concludes that 
there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs that a 
final judgment be entered on plaintiffs' first cause of action 
which judgment is entitled to direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
2. The answer and pleadings of defendants Vantage Income 
Properties and Bruce Honey are hereby stricken as to plaintiffs1 
first cause of action. 
3. Plaintiffs are granted judgment against defendants 
Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey, jointly and severally, 
for actual and consequential damages in the sum of $47,077.55. 
4. Under plaintiffs' first cause of action, damages are 
hereby trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1605 (as 
enacted in 1981) and judgment is hereby granted in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against all defendants Vantage Income Properties 
and Bruce Honey, jointly and severally, for the additional sum of 
$94,155.10. 
5 
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5- Plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against all 
defendants Vantage Income Properties and Bruce Honey, jointly and 
severally, for attorneys fees in the amount of $6,521.00. 
6. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on all of the above 
money judgments at the legal rate of 12% until such judgments are 
paid in full. 
7. To stay Plaintiffs enforcement of the above money 
judgments, Defendants must post a supersedeas bond in the sum of 
$53,598.55 or an appropriate property bond in double the amount 
of money damages (not trebled) 
8 c The court reserves judgment/against defendant Steve 
Holcomb. 
DATED this day of / / / f l ^ L ^ 1988. 
BY/THe\CQURT 
/Jiidge Timothy Hanson 
* r "~..'r>J^l_ 
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